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LOSS OF CHANCE IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE
Courts decide legal malpractice actions by applying both contract and
tort principles.' Traditional negligence doctrines are used in most tort
malpractice claims.2 Even so, standards for proving professional malprac-
tice, legal and otherwise, remain remarkably unresolved. 3 One tenacious
problem has been distinguishing harms caused by professional negligence
from those caused by other, nonculpable factors beyond the professional's
control.
In the medical malpractice context, some courts have isolated harms
caused by a physician's negligence f'rom those injuries caused by a preexist-
ing condition, and then compensated patients for the "loss of a chance." 4
The loss of chance doctrine recognizes that the chance of avoiding some
adverse result, or achieving some favorable result, is a compensable inter-
est even if the chance is less than fifty percent. In contrast, the traditional all
or nothing approach allows recovery for the entire harm only if the plaintiff
can prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence. 5
1. See, e.g., Miller v. Metzinger, 91 Cal. App. 3d 31, 154 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1979) (implied contract);
Peters v. Simmons, 87 Wn. 2d 400,552 P.2d 1053 (1976) (both tort and contract); Quezada v. Hart, 67
Cal. App. 3d 754, 136 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977) (tort); see also Togstad v. Veseley, Otto, Miller & Keefe,
291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980) (hybrid of both). Some courts defer all discussion of the distinction,
since little difference results from breaching a professional obligation under contract and violating a
standard of reasonable care imposed by tort. See Ryan v. Long, 35 Minn. 394, 29 N.W. 51 (1886). The
legal ramifications of bringing a claim under each of the two theories have been abrogated. See, e.g.,
Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962) (erosion of privity requirements of contract cause of action); Loveman v. Hamilton, 66 Ohio St.
2d 183, 420 N.E.2d 1007 (1981) (survival rule expanded to allow tort actions after death of the
defendant). See generally Haughey, Lawyer's Malpractice: A Comparative Appraisal, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 888, 894 (1973) ("privity is an anomaly"); Note, Extending Legal Malpractice Liability to
Nonclients-The Washington Supreme Court Considers the Privity Requirement, 61 WASH. L. REv. 761
(1986) (authored by Scott Peterson).
2. See, e.g., Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wn. 2d 581, 328 P.2d 164 (1958) (the principles of proof and
causation in legal malpractice do not differ from an ordinary negligence case). See generally Wade, The
Attorney's Liabilityfor Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755 (1959) (presenting various formulations of
the elements of legal malpractice tort actions).
3. R. MAU.EN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRAC' cE § 1, at 2 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter MALLEN &
L-vrr] (there is little agreement on the meaning of "legal malpractice" and no precise formula for
determining culpability).
4. See, e.g., Jeanes v. Milner, 428 E2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970); Hicks v. United States, 368 E2d 626
(4th Cir. 1966); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wn. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983). See generally
King, Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and
Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.L 1353 (1981) (the seminal article in articulating loss of chance);
Comment, Proving Causation in "Loss of a Chance" Cases:A ProportionalApproach, 34 CAT. U.L.
REv. 747 (1985) (discussion of the various kinds of loss of chance doctrines); Note, Recoveryfor "Loss
of Chance" in a Wrongful Death Action, 59 WASH. L. REv. 981 (1984) (analyzing loss of chance as
presented in Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wn. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983)).
5. See Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971)
(rejecting loss of chance in favor of the all or nothing approach). See generally King, supra note 4, at
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The current procedure for proving causation in legal malpractice, known
as the trial-within-a-trial method, has dissatisfied courts. 6 One unexplored
alternative is the loss of chance doctrine. 7 Compensable chances lost in
legal malpractice are capable of definition, and methods for valuing those
chances are available. 8 Procedural ramifications of proving legal loss of
chance and policy justifications for the doctrine support the incorporation
of loss of chance into some legal malpractice litigation. 9
I. METHODS OF PROOF OF LITIGATION MALPRACTICE
A. Traditional Approach
Courts have been reluctant to deviate from standards of traditional
negligence actions. 10 The burden of proving all elements of the legal
malpractice tort rests with the aggrieved client. "1 The formidable obstacle
is proving cause and injury, which together determine whether the negli-
gence will give rise to an action for damages. 12 Most courts determine
whether a claim is actionable by the trial-within-a-trial method whenever
the client's claim is based on an attorney's negligence regarding litiga-
tion. 13 Under this method, the client's cause of action depends on the
1376-78 (criticizing the all or nothing approach as arbitrary and contrary to deterrent objectives of tort).
6. See infra notes 10-36 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 37-48 and 81-90 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 91-116 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 117-33 and accompanying text. This Comment discusses legal malpractice only
in the context of litigation. Although malpractice actions exist for any facet of the client-attomey
relationship, litigation malpractice is clearly distinguishable. According to one recent study, 48.1% of
all claims arise out of litigation activities. Gates, The Newest Data, 70 A.B.A. J. 78,79 (Apr. 1984). To
illustrate, the two largest areas of legal malpractice other than litigation are preparation of documents
other than pleadings and consultation or advice. Id. at 79 (the two totalling 35.7% of the source of
malpractice claims).
10. See infra notes 15-36 and accompanying text.
11. See generally MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 3, § 551, at 675-76 (various statements ofelements
required). The client bears the burden of proving every essential element of cause even when the
attorney's delay or failure to conduct discovery has impaired the plaintiff's ability to produce evidence.
Id. § 657, at 811-12. See, e.g., Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wn. App. 78, 88,538 P.2d 1238, 1246 (1975)
(the elements required for a case in tort are: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) proximate cause, and (4) damages).
12. Proof of the breach of a duty owed establishes negligence; the two elements of cause and injury
merely determine whether negligence is actionable, meaning whether it will give rise to an action for
damages, W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OFTORTS
§ 30, at 165 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
13. Cause in fact has been accepted to mean the client's ability to establish that, but for the
attorney's negligence, the underlying action would have terminated in a more favorable result than
actually occurred. Spangler v. Sellers, 5 F. 882, 894-95 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881) (first enunciating the
principle of obtaining a better result). See generally Coggin, Attorney Negligence... A Suit Within a
Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 225 (1958) (coining the phrase "suit within a suit").
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resolution of the underlying action for which the attorney-client rela-
tionship was formed. 14 The reasoning is that if the result of the action would
have been the same, the client suffered no injury due to the attorney's
negligence.
In the trial-within-a-trial method, the malpractice client must recon-
struct the underlying action. If the client were a plaintiff in the litigation,
the burden is to show the existence of a valid claim upon which there was a
greater than fifty percent likelihood of prevailing but for the attorney's
error. 15 For defendants, the evidence must affirmatively show a meritorious
defense which would have either precluded any recovery or reduced the
amount of the judgment but for the attorney's negligence. 16 Failure-to-
appeal cases typically require the client to prove that the attorney's negli-
gence prevented both an appeal' 7 and a remand' 8 which more likely than
not would have resulted favorably.
Evidence in the malpractice trial is restricted to that which would have
been admitted in the underlying proceeding. 19 Where the trial has not been
entirely foreclosed, a full-scale replication might be unnecessary. Instead,
courts will merely relitigate the parts of the trial affected by the alleged
error, using the prior pleadings, transcripts, and existing records to supply
the remaining evidence. 20 With failure-to-appeal cases, the client does not
14. MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 3, § 551, at 675-76 ("[r]he existence of a cause of action
depends on the client's ability to establish that but for the attorney's neglect, the litigation would have
terminated in a result more favorable."). To achieve this standard, the client actually recreates the
underlying trial for the malpractice court. Id. § 656, at 810.
15. See, e.g., Godbout v. Norton, 262 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 901
(1978); see also MALLEN & Lavrr, supra note 3, § 557, at 690 (the plaintiff also bears the burden of
proving that judgment was collectible).
16. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397 (4th Cir. 1916).
17. Chicago Red Top Cab Ass'n v. Gaines, 49 Ill. App. 3d 322, 364 N.E.2d 328, 329 (1977)
(burden on plaintiff to establish success of appeal).
18. See, e.g., Pusey v. Reed, 258 A.2d 460,461 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969) ("[wihere the negligence
relied upon is a failure to take an appeal, it must be shown that, if an appeal had been taken, a more
favorable result would have been reached."). See generally Comment, AttorneyMalpractice: Problems
Associated With Failure-to-Appeal Cases, 31 BUFFALO L. REv. 583, 589 (1982) (the failure-to-appeal
client must prove not only that the appellate court would have accepted the review.and ruled favorably,
but also that the remand would have been successful, an "added variable" which makes plaintiff's
burden more difficult than in simple malpractice suits).
19. Kessler v. Gray, 77 Cal. App. 3d 284, 143 Cal. Rptr. 496, 499 (1978). In general, the trier of
fact decides the underlying action just as if that were the claim being litigated at the malpractice trial,
and the evidence and jury instructions are subject to the same rules and standards as would have been
applied in the underlying action. E.g., Ortiz v. Barrett, 222 Va. 118, 278 S.E.2d 833 (1981). See
generally MALLEN & Lavrr, supra note 3, § 661, at 830 (criterion for determining admissibility is
whether evidence would have been admissible in underlying action). Experts who would have been used
in the underlying action are allowed only to testify as they might have in that preceding action. Id. at
846-47.
20. See Woodruff v. Tomlin, 423 F Supp. 1284, 1287 (W.D.Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 593 F.2d 33
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receive the benefit of extrinsic evidence regarding the result of appeal. 21
The outcome of the remanded action is concluded from existing records.
22
The recreation of the underlying action also determines the amount of
damages awarded. 23 The measure of damages is what the client should have
recovered in the original trial, less what was actually recovered. 24 The jury
in the malpractice trial is presented with the same evidence to aid in its
determination of damages as the jury in the underlying proceeding would
have been allowed to consider.25 Thus, the attorney is liable for any amount
the malpractice jury determines would have been the judgment in the
underlying action.
B. Dissatisfaction with Current Practice
The reality of the trial-within-a-trial method clearly does not meet the
promise of a full, theoretically complete reconstruction of the original
lawsuit. Dissatisfied courts have struggled with the method, partly because
(1978), reh'g granted, 616 E2d 924 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980) (transcript of
underlying action read to the jury); Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wn. 2d 854, 861, 601 P.2d 1279, 1283-84
(1979) (transcript provides the best evidence of what transpired). See generally MALLEN & LEvrr, supra
note 3, § 670, at 852-53 (proving the underlying action by use of transcripts and existing records).
21. See, e.g., Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255, 1256 (1977); Pete v. Henderson, 124
Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78, 80 (1954). Failure-to-appeal cases, unlike other legal malpractice cases,
treat causation as a question of law, and evidentiary restrictions flow directly from this premise.
MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 3, § 583, at 738-40. See generally Breslin & McMonigle, The Use of
Expert Testimony in Actions Against Attorneys, 47 INS. COUNS. J. 119 (1980) (failure-to-appeal cases do
not admit experts to show that the original action would have been modified on appeal because such
testimony is irrelevant on legal issues).
22. See, e.g., Better Homes, Inc. v. Rodgers, 195 F. Supp. 93, 94 (N.D. W.Va. 1961) (record and
transcript submitted by stipulation); Collins v. Wanner, 382 P.2d 105, 108 (Okla. 1963) (trial court
reversed on appeal for admitting testimony outside the record below). See generally Comment, supra
note 18, at 601 (in determining the result of the hypothetically remanded action, the only type of
evidence admissible is that which was a part of the earlier adjudication).
23. See, e.g., Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322,326 (D.C. Pa. 1978) (damages measured by
amount of judgment which could have been recovered in underlying action).
24. E.g., Ware v. Durham, 246 Ga. 84,268 S.E.2d 668,669 (1980). Expenses incurred because of
negligence, such as attorney's fees in mitigating losses, will sometimes be awarded. E.g., Coats v.
Bussard, 94 Mich. App. 558, 288 N.W.2d 651, 654-55 (1980) (cost of unsuccessful appeal allowed).
The causation issue is often treated as one of damages because the trial-within-a-trial method both
determines cause and ascertains the amount of damages. Coggin, supra note 13, at 226; see also
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397,402 (4th Cir. 1916) (court noted this problem); Comment,
A Modern Approach to the Legal Malpractice Tort, 52 IND. L.J. 689, 694 (1977) ("since the litigation
malpractice plaintiff must also prove causation in order to prove damages, the suit within a suit
requirement produces a bootstrapping effect which denies recovery to clients who have lost valid
underlying actions as well as to those who had no valid action at the outset .... ").
25. The defendant-attorney may present evidence to argue damages just as the original defendant
would have. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 578 P.2d 935, 938, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221
(1978) (client found to be 2.5% contributorily negligent in comparative negligence jurisdiction);
Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wn. App. 78, 87, 538 P.2d 1238, 1245 (1975) (contributory negligence for
trier of fact).
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of the impossibility of accurate reconstruction, and partly because of the
client's difficult burden of proof.26 Commentators assert that the trial-
within-a-trial method actually insulates attorneys from liability and is
inaccurate because "parties face academic claims of liability and use
evidence which is not quite what it seems. ",27 The evidence is restricted to
what would have been admitted had the underlying action taken place,
despite the fact that the passing of time is bound to impact the quality of the
evidence. 28 The ultimate irony is that the attorney is placed in an adversary
position and must oppose a cause which he once advocated. 29 Moreover,
the attorney has better insights concerning weaknesses in the client's case
than did the original defendant.
Some courts have experimented with the use of presumptions, burden
shifting, and res ipsa loquitur to aid the legal malpractice plaintiff.30 The
analysis in one line of cases is that once the client has shown a causal
connection between the defendant's negligence and the loss of the action,
the defendant has the burden of Showing that the underlying action was not
meritorious. 31 In an alternative approach reaching the same result, the
26. See generally Comment, The Standard of Proof of Causation in Legal Malpractice Cases, 63
CoRNELL L. REv. 666, 676-77 (1978) (discussing alternative standards of causation); Comment, supra
note 24, at 701-04 (analyzing cases which abrogate the trial-within-a-trial method of proof).
27. MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 3, § 650, at 797. See generally Wallach & Kelly, Attorney
Malpractice in California: A Shaky Citadel, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 257 (1970) ("The lawyer who
commits a malpractice in the representation of his clients. . . is protected by a maze of ancient legal
principles which make it virtually impossible for the injured client to be made whole or even for the
lawyer to be reprimanded."); Comment, supra note 26, at 670 ("A standard of proof that requires a
plaintiff to prove to a virtual certainty that, but for the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff would have
prevailed in the underlying action, in effect immunizes most negligent attorneys from liability.");
Comment, supra note 24, at 689 ("As a result of the persistent application of legal principles long
abandoned in otherareas of tortlaw, the legal malpractice plalntiffoften loses even before he is heard on
the merits of his action.").
28. The harshness of evidentiary restrictions is illustrated by Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super.
290, 319 A.2d 781 (1974), where the attorney's failure to pursue discovery led to the loss of evidence
crucial to the client's underlying claim-and actually increased the plaintiff's difficulties for proof in the
malpractice action because the passage of time had precluded obtaining that information. See also
MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 3, § 656, at 810.
29. MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 3, § 650,'at 797.
30. Proponents of these techniques cite Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91
Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970) (unattended hotel swimming pool), and Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d
1 (1948) (cross-firing hunters), as support for the proposition that the defendant should share responsi-
bility for proof of causation when the defendant's negligence has made it impossible or difficult for the
plaintiff to bear the full burden of proof. See Comment, supra note 24, at 701 (suggesting a "modified
res ipsa loquitur" as a solution to the plaintiff's dilemma).
31. See, for instance, Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Iowa 1975), where the court employed
the presumption that the client's underlying claim was meritorious because the attorney's decision to
bring the action evidences the existence of a valid claim. See also Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super.
290, 319 A.2d 781, 784 (1974) ("Once plaintiff has shown-that -defendant allowed the statute to run
against her claim, defendant should have the burden of coming forward with evidence that the statute
would not be a bar."). See generally Haughey, supra note 1, at 893 ("[I]t might not be too unreasonable
1483
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attorney, not the client, bears the burden of ascertaining the value of the
client's loss by proving the extent of harm not attributable to the prima facie
malpractice error. 32 Other courts have altered the trial-within-a-trial
method more directly, by reducing the amount of evidence required to
reach the jury. 33
Most of the legal malpractice cases in which courts have deviated from
traditional standards of causation are based on clear-cut, nonjudgmental
negligence evidenced by violations of court or statutory rules. 34 Courts
have been less likely to make such departures for allegations of attorney
negligence based on violations of the standard of care. The former is akin to
negligence per se, while the latter is more difficult for a client to prove. 3
Where the malpractice action rests on a procedural error which cannot be
attributed to attorney judgment, courts are reluctant to allow attorneys to
escape liability simply because the client's underlying lawsuit would not
have been successful. 36 Thus, courts are most willing to permit clients to
escape the rigors of the trial-within-a-trial method where there is no
question of the standard of care, and when breach of duty is not an issue.
to require the attorney to prove the lack of merit in the claim he encouraged his client to pursue.").
32. See, e.g., Winter v. Brown, 365 A.2d 381 (D.C. 1976); see also Grayson v. Wilkinson, 7 Miss.
(5 S. & M.) 268 (1845) (where the attorney failed to appear, the court held that the lawyer responsible
for a default judgment must prove the client suffered no actual damages, rather than requiring the client
to show he would have prevailed).
33. In Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 596 n.9, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621,628 n.9 (1975)
despite the absence of a trial-within-a-trial and traditional proof of causation, Judge Mosk refused to
upset the jury's inference of malpractice based on the attorney's negligence in failing to assert the
client's community interest. This case followed Walker v. Porter, 44 Cal. App. 3d 174, 118 Cal. Rptr.
468, 470 (1974), where the plaintiff was unable to prove which of three defendants in the underlying
action was responsible for her harm, but the California court nevertheless rejected the defendant/
attorney's contention that the plaintiff was required to prove this additional burden. These two cases are
seen as seriously undermining the requirement that the client prove the merits of his case by the trial-
within-a-trial method. Comment, supra note 26, at 677; see also Note, Legal Malpractice-Erosion of
the Traditional Suit Within a Suit Requirement, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 328, 339 (1975).
34. Winter v. Brown, 365 A.2d 381 (D.C. 1976) (failure to give statutory notice; the court
employed burden shifting); Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1975) (failure to plead statutory
element; presumption of malpractice); Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super. 290, 319 A.2d 781, (1974)
(failure to meet statute of limitations; use of res ipsa loquitur).
35. See, e.g., Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super. 290, 319 A.2d 781, 784(1974) ("[F]ailure of
an attorney to commence an action within the time of the statute would ordinarily be considered
neglect. ").
36. See, for instance, Ruchti v. Goldfein, 113 Cal. App. 3d 928, 170 Cal. Rptr. 375,378-79 (1980),
where failure to assert a client's community property rights to retirement benefits in a divorce
proceeding resulted in loss of income, the court excused the attorney's conduct on the grounds that
community property law regarding interests in retirement benefits was unsettled. Id. In contrast, see
Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1975), in which the attorney's failure to plead the statutory
element of the existence of a license in a dramshop action resulted in dismissal. The court went outside
the accepted bounds of malpractice procedures to impose liability through the use of presumptions. Id.
at 110. The former situation is at least partially attributable to judgment; the latter is a technical
violation.
1484
Legal Loss of Chance
II. LOSS OF CHANCE
A. The Medical Context
Medical malpractice law has preceded legal malpractice in reconcep-
tualizing what constitutes injury rather than changing traditional standards
of causation. The issue has arisen where alleged mistreatment exacerbates
a preexisting condition, and both contribute to some end result that does not
appear readily divisible. 37 Loss of chance operates as a device to compen-
sate for the chance to avoid or decrease the harm that results. 38
There are two approaches to the loss of chance doctrine in medical
malpractice, emphasizing cause and injury, respectively. The Washington
Supreme Court had recent occasion to review both approaches in a case of
mistreatment of a preexisting condition. In Herskovits v. Group Health
Cooperative of Puget Sound,39 the personal representative of a lung-cancer
victim recovered for the harm resulting from misdiagnosis. Since the
cancer was terminal, the estate was unable to prove that but for the
misdiagnosis, the decedent would have lived.40 While the court failed to
reach a majority on the loss of chance doctrine (the lead opinion applied the
concept to causation, and the plurality opinion viewed its relevance to
injury), the court agreed that a cause of action had been stated and
remanded for a trial on the merits.41
The causation approach presented by the lead opinion in Herskovits rests
on the "increased risks" principle of torts. 42 Under this principle, if the
defendant's conduct has not created a dangerous force, but has increased
the plaintiff's risk of harm from that force, the threshold of proof required
to make a prima facie case of negligence is relaxed.43 Once it has been
determined that the defendant's negligence increased the risk, the plaintiff
need only prove the negligence was a substantial factor in producing the
harm.44
37. King, supra note 4, at 1359.
38. Id.
39. 99 Wn. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
40. Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 610, 664 P.2d at 474. The evidence showed that at most the delay, in
diagnosis might have reduced the chance of a five year survival by 14%. Id. at 611, 664 P.2d at 475.
4), Id. at 619, 664 P.2d at 479.
42. Id. at 610-19, 664 P.2d at 474-79.
43. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 323(a) (1965). For cases applying the increased risks
notion, see McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972); Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626
(4th Cir. 1966); and Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978). Justice Dore's opinion in
Herskovits allowed recovery where the lost chance of survival was a "substantial factor" in causing
death rather than requiring the patient to prove that but for the misdiagnosis, he would have lived. 99
Wn. 2d at 614-15, 664 P.2d at 477.
44. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wn. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983). In more tangible
terms, the patient had to only prove that the 14% loss of chance was a substantial factor in causing death.
Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 619, 664 P.2d at 479.
1485
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The injury approach of the doctrine emphasizes separation of causation
and injury. Under this approach, what caused the lost chance is removed
from what the nature and extent of the loss are. 45 Once the patient proves
that but for the negligent conduct, a better opportunity existed, the injury
approach to loss of chance simply provides a method of placing compens-
able worth upon the reduction or destruction of that opportunity.46 Justice
Pearson's plurality opinion in Herskovits argued that the injury approach of
loss of chance is preferable because cause in fact is proved in terms
consistent with traditional tort principles. 47 Rather than lowering the stan-
dard of proof, this approach defines injury as the chance lost, not the total
harm. 48 Loss of chance operates when it can be proved by a but for standard
that the malpractice reduced the possibility of a better result.
B. The Legal Context
1. Daugert v. Pappas
In Daugert v. Pappas,49 the Washington Supreme Court declined to
apply the loss of chance method to the legal context of negligence in failing
to perfect an appeal, but at the same time clarified the loss of chance
doctrine. 50 The reasoning in Daugert warrants careful analysis both
45. The injury strand relies on Professor King's thesis set forth in his article on loss of chance.
King, supra note 4; see O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971); Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598
(8th Cir. 1970); James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
46. King, supra note 4, at 1364-65; see, e.g., Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598, 604 (8th Cir. 1970)
(reduction of a statistical survival rate from 35% to 24% sufficient evidence to show that patient's "life
would have been saved or at least prolonged and his pain lessened had he received early treatment").
47. Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 634, 664 P.2d at 487. Under the injury approach, the plaintiff did not
need to prove that the misdiagnosis caused death. Rather, the burden was to prove that but for the
physician's negligence, the 14% chance of five-year survival would not have been lost. Id. One writer
referred to Justice Pearson's plurality opinion in Herskovits as "the clearest judicial understanding to
date of the notion of recovery for loss of a chance. It should be referred to by other courts desiring to
provide their jurisdictions with a more rational framework in which to evaluate damages for loss of a
chance .... " Comment, supra note 4, at 768.
48. Compensation for the injury "would depend on the extent to which it appeared that cancer
killed the patient sooner than it would have with timely diagnosis and treatment, and on the extent to
which the delay in diagnosis aggravated the patient's condition .... "King, supra note 4, at 1364. In
Herskovits, Justice Pearson, citing an illustration from Professor King's article, implies that the proper
award for the patient would be 14% of the wrongful death award. 99 Wn. 2d at 634, 664 P.2d at 487. But
see Note, supra note 4, at 985 (criticizing application of the wrongful death statute because redefining
the harm as loss of chance rather than death would seem to "place recovery outside the bounds of the
[wrongful death] statute .... ").
49. 104 Wn. 2d 254, 704 P.2d 600 (1985).
50. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 261, 704 P.2d at 605. In the underlying litigation which gave rise to the
malpractice action ofDaugert v. Pappas, the client was the defendant in a contract dispute. Id. at 255,
704 P.2d at 602. The client/developer sold a recreational complex under an agreement with an
arbitration clause, but subsequently refuted findings made by an independent appraiser. The client/
developer's refusal to abide by the settlement agreement prompted the purchaser to bring an action for
1486
Legal Loss of Chance
because it is the first legal malpractice case to discuss loss of chance, and
because the Washington court has been a jurisprudential bellwether in its
application of loss of chance to medical malpractice. 51
The client in Daugert brought a failure-to-appeal malpractice action
under the loss of chance doctrine rather than the traditional trial-within-a-
trial method of proving causation in legal malpractice. 52 The jury was asked
to determine whether the attorney's negligence was a substantial factor in
judgment being entered against the client; jury instructions followed the
lead opinion in Herskovits. 53 The verdict that the attorney's negligence had
caused the loss of a twenty percent chance for successful appeal was based
on expert testimony.54 Because that twenty percent was also found to be a
substantial factor in judgment being entered against the client, the attorney
was liable for the injury.55
specific performance. Id. The trial court found in favor of the client/developer, but on appeal the
arbitration clause was held valid and enforceable. Id. at 256, 704 P.2d at 602. At this point, the
developer instructed its attorney to petition the supreme court for review. Id. Because the attorney
missed the filing date and failed to follow proper procedures for requesting an extension, the court
entered judgment against the client. Id. at 256, 704 P.2d at 602. Thereafter, the developer sued the
attorney for malpractice. Id. Duty and breach were resolved on summary judgment. The only issue at
trial was whether the client's claim was actionable; specifically, whether the attorney's negligence was a
proximate cause of the judgment being entered against the developer. Id.
51. Herskovits has influenced numerous court holdings. See, e.g., Mays v. United States, 608 F.
Supp. 1476, 1481 (Colo. 1985); Curry v. Summer, 136 Ill. App. 3d 468, 483 N.E.2d 711, 719 (1985);
Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824, 827-28 (Mont. 1985). The case has also been the topic of several
recent articles on loss of chance. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 4; Comment, Increased Risk of
Disease from Hazardous Waste: A Proposal for Judicial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REv. 635 (1985); Note,
supra note 4.
52. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 256,704 P.2d at 602; see also supra notes 10-25 and accompanying
text. Negligence was not an issue in Daugert. The determination of negligence precedes causation:
whether the attorney erred is for the court to determine as a matter of law before the trier of fact decides
causation. See, e.g., Stafford v. Garrett, 46 Or. App. 781,613 P.2d 99 (1980). See generally MALLN &
LEvrr, supra note 3, § 659, at 819-26 (issues of law or fact). Following that, most determinations of
cause in fact are made by the jury consistent with the principles of proof and causation in an ordinary
negligence case. Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wn. 2d 581, 584, 328 P.2d 164, 166 (1958), cited by Daugert v.
Pappas, 104 Wn. 2d 254, 257, 704 P.2d 600, 603 (1985). An exception is that failure-to-appeal cases,
like Daugert, decide both negligence and causation as questions of law. See infra notes 69-73 and
accompanying text.
53. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 256,704 P.2d at 603. The jury was given a three-step analytic to use in
deciding if the client met the necessary burden of proof. The first question was whether the attorney's
malpractice was a cause in fact of the loss of chance to avoid damages. The next step was to determine
the percentage chance, if any, that the supreme court would have accepted review and reversed the court
of appeals. Finally, the jury was to decide whether the percentage chance lost was a substantial factor in
bringing about the judgment entered against the client. Id.
54. Id. at 256, 704 P.2d at 602.
55. Id. at 256, 704 P.2d at 603. Twenty percent of the total amount of damages incurred in the
underlying action was awarded to the client.
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The Washington Supreme Court rejected the trial court's formulation of
cause. The court unanimously reaffirmed the traditional method and stan-
dard of proving cause in legal malpractice, holding that the plaintiff must
use the trial-within-a-trial method and prove that but for the attorney's
negligence, the client probably would have prevailed on appeal. 56
The court considered the appropriate standards and methods for deter-
mining cause in fact. 57 Justice Pearson commented that the traditional
standard burdens the client with proving that the underlying case would
have been successful but for the negligence of the attorney.58 Justice
Pearson acknowledged that the but for test had been the subject of criticism
and recognized "the harsh consequences of applying the but for test in the
traditional manner." '59 He also noted that but for causation had been
"recently reevaluated" in the Herskovits medical malpractice case. 60 How-
ever, as he saw it, that case redefined the injury to mean "[a] reduction in
one's opportunity to recover," and because the lost chance is the injury,
proof of causation by the but for standard was not discarded. 61
The Daugert opinion related loss of chance to the concept of injury and
retained the traditional but for standard of causation. The court rejected the
causation approach to loss of chance, believing it "inappropriate at this
time to change the [but for] test" in legal malpractice actions. 62 The
Daugert formula redefined injury so that the aggravation of preexisting
56. Id. at 256, 263, 704 P.2d at 603, 606.
57. Id. at 259, 704 P.2d at 604.
58. Id. at 260, 704 P.2d at 604. Justice Pearson also held more-likely-than-not as the degree of
proof required for causation. Id. at 263, 704 P.2d at 606. (citing O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 73 Wn. 2d 814,
824, 440 P.2d 823 (1968)). In doing so, the court rejected the line of cases which have extended the
degree of proof to the stricter standard of certainty. See, e.g., Coon v. Ginsberg, 32 Colo. App. 206,509
P.2d 1293 (1973), noted in Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wn. 2d 254, 263, 704 P.2d 600, 606 (1985).
59. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 260, 704 P.2d at 605. See Comment, supra note 24, at 693 (criticism
that the trial-within-a-trial method extends the burden of proof normally required by making the
plaintiff prove two actions); see also supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
60. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 260,704 P.2d at 604-05 (citing Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99
Wn. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983)); see supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
61. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 261, 704 P.2d at 605. Thus, while the method of proving cause is
different under loss of chance, the standard of proof remains unchanged. "The primary thrust of
Herskovits was that a doctor's misdiagnosis of cancer either deprives a decedent of a chance of
surviving a potentially fatal condition or reduces that chance." Id.
62. Id. Both the underlying parties and the trial court had mistakenly relied on the lead opinion in
Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 609, 664 P.2d at 476, and argued the substantial factor approach to loss of
chance. Appellant's Reply Brief at 8, Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wn. 2d 254, 704 P.2d 600 (1985); Brief of
Respondents and Cross-Appellants at 10, Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wn. 2d 254, 704 P.2d 600 (1985).
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conditions or the loss of a chance to avoid harm or achieve a favorable result
was viewed as a compensable interest.63
After stating that "a reduction in one's opportunity to recover" requires
compensation, the Daugert court declined to view the loss of a chance to
appeal as within the purview of the doctrine.64 In dicta, the court distin-
guished a failure-to-appeal client from a terminally ill patient. 65 Acknowl-
edging that any "reduction in one's opportunity to recover" should be
compensable, the court emphasized that a failure-to-appeal client has not
lost any chance because a failure-to-appeal client's case eventually will be
reviewed. 66 If the malpractice trial judge decides the appeal would not have
succeeded, that decision is itself subject to review by higher courts. 67 The
court acknowledged the confusion over the but for standard prompted by
Herskovits and, in an unprecedented move, invited the client to submit his
petition to determine whether review would have been accepted and
whether the remand would have been favorable. 68
2. Impact of the Daugert v. Pappas Decision
The holding of Daugert rests largely on the court's acceptance that
failure-to-appeal cases are different in nature from most legal malpractice
actions. 69 Causation is a question of law in failure-to-appeal cases, 70 an
63. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 261,704 P.2d at 605. Under loss of chance, two kinds of losses are
compensable. One is "definitive" loss of either completely avoiding a specific harm or of achieving a
fairly definitive favorable result. The other is "partial" loss due to aggravation or acceleration of the
untoward effects of some preexisting condition, or acceleration of some adverse preordained result.
King, supra note 4, at 1363-64.
64. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 261-62, 704 P.2d at 605.
65. Id. at 261, 704 P.2d at 605. -
66. Id.
67. Id.
[Where the issue is whether the Supreme Court would have accepted review and rendered a
decision more favorable to the client, there is no lost chance. . . the client's underlying claim was
not reviewed by the court initially because of the attorney's negligence. However, in the subse-
quent malpractice action the trial judge should have decided whether the Supreme Court would
have accepted review and held in favor of the client. If the trial judge found review would have been
denied, the client could have sought review in the Court of Appeals and ultimately in the Supreme
Court.
Id.
68. Id. at 263,704 P.2d at 606. The court noted that this would only determine the legal question of
cause, leaving the factual determination of injury as measured by the underlying claim up to the jury. Id.
at 264, 704 P.2d at 606.
69. Id. at 263, 704 P.2d at 606. "[W]e hold the client must prove that, but for the attorney's
negligence, the plaintiff would probably have prevailed upon appeal in a legal malpractice action
wherein the negligence occurs at the appellate level." Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 258,704 P.2d at 603. The Washington court is in line with the overwhelming majority of
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anomaly largely due to practical considerations ofjudicial efficiency. 71 The
judge is in a "much better position" to determine questions of legal
analysis and rules of appellate procedure, even though the question of
causation is usually for the jury.72 These strong practical considerations are
emphasized by Daugert's unusual conclusion of allowing the parties to
petition the supreme court, enabling a definitive determination of causa-
tion. 73
Apparently, these considerations preclude the application of loss of
chance to failure-to-appeal cases in Washington. Despite this fact, or
perhaps because of it, the Daugert opinion nonetheless is important
because it presented the Washington court with an opportunity to clarify
loss of chance.
First, on a broad level of analysis, the court applied the loss of chance
doctrine to injury. Justice Pearson called this doctrine "nontraditional"
because the injury is reconceptualized, not because the standard of proof is
changed. 74 After the initial step of reconceptualizing the harm, loss of
chance still requires the plaintiff to prove causation by a but for standard. 75
courts in treating failure-to-appeal cases specially. See, e.g., Chocktootv. Smith, 280 Or. 567,573,571
P.2d 1255, 1258 (1977) (question of law because legal consequences of failure to appeal are "matters for
argument, not proof...."); Better Homes, Inc. v. Rodgers, 195 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D. W.Va. 1961)
(both question of appeal and success of underlying action treated as questions of law); Pete v.
Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78, 81 (1954) (early application of fact/law distinction); see
also MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 3, § 583, at 738 n. 11 (listing current holdings in accord with Daugert
v. Pappas). The policy rationale found in Daugert is that judges are inherently more qualified to decide
what result might have been reached by an appellate court than the average juror, since the issues are
legal and understanding the rules of appellate procedure is critical. Daugert, 104Wn. 2d at 258-59,704
P.2d at 604; see also Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 573, 571 P.2d 1255, 1258 (1977) ("the jury
cannot decide a disputed issue of law," whether it arises in determining the result of appeal or the result
of new trial).
71. In Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d487,269 P.2d 78, 80 (1954), a California trial court was
compelled by practical reasons to decide cause as a matter of law, although it expressed reticence in
performing the appellate court's role. Also see Better Homes, Inc. v. Rodgers, 195 F. Supp. 93, 97
(N.D. W.Va. 1961), where the trial judge followed the majority, but stated that deciding whether
judgment would have been reversed on appeal was a "repugnant" task. This judicial attitude was noted
in Daugert. 104 Wn. 2d at 259, 704 P.2d at 604.
72. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 258, 259, 704 P.2d at 604, 604. The fact that determinations of cause
would normally be within the sole province of the jury was expressly noted. Id. at 257,704 P.2d at 603.
73. Id. at 263-64, 704 P.2d at 606.
74. Id. at 261, 704 P.2d at 605.
75. Id. Justice Dore's lead opinion in Herskovits advocating the substantial factor test is limited by
Daugert, a unanimous decision. Id. at 262. One dissent in Herskovits had stated that the substantial
factor test should be reserved for those situations where one or the other of the forces could have caused
the harm that resulted. Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 638, 664 P.2d at 489 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
Justice Brachtenbach argued that it is illogical to ask ajury to determine that a 14% loss of survival over
a five-year period is sufficient in and of itself to have caused death. Id. at 639, 664 P.2d at 489. Other
courts applying this approach to the loss of chance have allowed percentage chances as low as five
percent to go to the jury. Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 597,688 P.2d 605 (1984).
According to the current view of the Washington court, the substantial factor test is not an appropriate
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Second, on a more specific factual level, the Daugert court found that the
harm caused by failure to file an appeal was not susceptible to this
reconceptualization process. 76 The primary basis for this conclusion was
that the failure-to-appeal client has not yet lost all opportunities to appeal
the case, and thus the loss is not sufficiently final to justify loss of chance.77
This conclusion leaves open the question of whether incorporating the
loss of chance doctrine into legal malpractice analysis should ever occur.
At the very least, the case is significant because it shows a willingness of
the court to consider loss of chance in legal malpractice. 78 Also, failure-to-
appeal cases are unique and rare malpractice situations, and excluding this
type of case from the loss of chance doctrine has little practical effect. 79
Finally, the court's reasons for rejecting loss of chance may not have been
entirely correct.8 0 When analyzed in terms of the loss of chance doctrine as
it arose in the medical context, the elements all seem to exist in the failure-
to-appeal legal context as well.
I. ANALYSIS
A. The Elements of a Loss of Chance Cause of Action
Four elements make up the loss of chance doctrine in the medical
context. First, loss of chance operates where the patient has a health
problem which may be treated by professional medical treatment. This is
called the preexisting condition.81 Using the prototypical case, the cancer
which the patient had before seeking the physician's treatment is the
preexisting condition. 82
standard when one of the multiple factors alone could be isolated as the cause. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at
262, 704 P.2d at 605. Where loss of chance is applied, the preexisting condition is usually capable of
causing the harm, and the problem arises in assessing the harm caused by negligence. See generally
Comment, supra note 4, at 774 (suggesting that the causal approach to loss of chance eliminates
"incentives for courts to tamper with the traditional causation standard of proof .... "); Note, supra
note 4, at 988 n.31 (Washington has explicitly rejected the substantial factor test injury instructions).
76. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 261, 704 P.2d at 604.
77. Id. But see infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
78. In rejecting the substantial factor test, the court favored defining the compensable interest over
tampering with traditional standards of proof. Notably, this preference for traditional standards
underlies the current retention of the trial-within-a-trial method of proving legal malpractice as well.
See supra notes 10-36 and accompanying text. Thus, loss of chance warrants consideration as an
alternative method of proof in that context.
79. The fact that the attorney's negligence occurred at the appeal stage puts this case in a small
minority of legal malpractice actions revolving around a failure to appeal. Gates, supra note 9, at 79
("post-trial or hearing" errors constitute 1.9% of legal malpractice cases).
80. See infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
81. Loss of chance operates where there is a preexisting condition that is "attached" or sufficiently
associated with the plaintiff to be factored into assessing the interests destroyed, and became so attached
before the defendant's conduct affected the plaintiff. King, supra note 4, at 1357.
82. See, e.g., James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980); O'Brien v. Stover, 443
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Second, given the patient's preexisting condition when a doctor is
consulted, the patient has a certain likelihood of recovering from the health
problem if the physician exercises proper care in treating the condition. 83 In
loss of chance parlance, this is called the opportunity to recover. For
example, when a cancer patient seeks medical advice, the patient at that
point has a certain likelihood of surviving that cancer, so long as the doctor
exercises ordinary care.84 The term opportunity to recover does not mean
that total recovery must be probable. Often the patient does not have a
greater than fifty percent probability of being cured. 85 Even if the cancer is
terminal, the patient nonetheless has some opportunity to recover when the
physician's care is first sought. Loss of chance focuses on the potential
chance, however slight, that the patient will recover.
Third, the patient's potential opportunity to recover from the preexisting
illness must be foreshortened or diminished by the physician's negligent
treatment. 86 When the doctor negligently misdiagnoses the patient's cancer
and causes a six month delay in treatment, the patient's likelihood of
recovery is reduced. 87 While the physician is not a guarantor of positive
results, the duty of care requires that no negligence occur. The loss of
chance doctrine addresses the reduced opportunity to recover caused by the
physician's negligence.
The fourth and final element of loss of chance is that the lost opportunity
must be entirely foreclosed; the patient's chance for recovery must be
irretrievably lost. 88 A cancer patient cannot replace a lost opportunity for
beneficial treatment due to a six month delay in treatment. 89 If the damage
F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wn. 2d 609,664 P.2d 474(1983). The
four elements of loss of chance are particularly clear where the patient's opportunity to survive
preexisting cancer is diminished by the physician's treatment.
83. See Wolfstone & Wolfstone, Recovery of Damage for the Loss of a Chance, 1982 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 121; see also James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 58 1, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1980) ("No matter how
small that chance may have been . . . no one can say that the chance of prolonging one's life. . . is
valueless. ").
84. For instance, the survival rate for cancer patients is determined by reference to three stages of
deterioration. Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598, 604 (1970). Even in the final stage, there is still some
possibility of survival for a six-month period. See Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 612, 664 P.2d at 475.
85. See, e.g., Sharp v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 710 P.2d 1153 (Colo. App. 1985) (the patient's
15-40% chance of heart attack was reduced by 20-25%); Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 141
Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984) (allowed recovery for destruction of a five percent chance); Herskovits,
99 Wn. 2d at 610, 664 P.2d at 474 (estate proved that the decedent lost a 14% chance of survival).
86. See Comment, supra note 4, at 749 (in medical loss of chance cases, a tortfeasor, through his
negligence, causes an individual to lose a chance to avoid some form of harm).
87 King, supra note 4, at 1356, 1359 ("[D]efendant's conduct generally will not have been a cause
of the entire harm, because the effect of the preexisting force almost always will have reduced the value
of the interest that the defendant destroyed." (emphasis in original)).
88. King, supra note 4, at 1364 (the author distinguishes between partial and definitive losses, but
states that both must be "destroyed").
89. Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 612, 664 P.2d at 475.
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can be mitigated, however, then the loss of chance doctrine is inapplicable.
For example, if a miracle cancer cure were available, then the patient may
not claim that a chance for recovery was entirely lost.90
Loss of chance is operational only in those medical malpractice cases in
which these elements exist. Initially, the patient must have a preexisting
condition. Then, although treatment may not affect the existence of the
patient's preexisting condition, a potential opportunity for recovery must
exist, assuming ordinary health care. Next, the physician's negligence must
foreshorten that opportunity for recovery. Finally, the treatment must be
such that this reduction in opportunity to recover is entirely foreclosed. .
B. Analogy to Legal Malpractice
If the loss of chance doctrine is to be applied in legal malpractice, the
circumstances giving rise to the cause of action must satisfy the-requisite.
elements of loss of chance. The terminology may be different in the legal
context, but the conditions producing loss of chance are not merely rhetori-
cal.
In the legal context, the preexisting condition consists of the facts and
circumstances that make up the client's cause of action or defense. The
facts underlying this cause of action or defense are analogous to the injury
or disease that is the preexisting condition in the medical context. In both
situations, the clients come to the professional to seek advice to solve their
"problem." The facts surrounding that problem, like the patient's injury,
exist before he or she seeks professional help.91
Given the facts of the client's case when legal advice is sought, there
exists a certain likelihood of receiving a successful result based on these
facts. This potential is the client's opportunity to recover. The value of this
opportunity is based on the strength or weakness of the facts underlying the
client's cause of action or defense. In terms of present value, the lost
opportunity for recovery ranges between a maximum trial result to a
minimum settlement value.92
This opportunity for recovery must be foreshortened or reduced by
attorney conduct that breaches the duty of care. Because of the attorney's
90. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 261, 704 P.2d at 604.
91. Lawyers themselves produce parts of a client's case, such as providing insight that testimony of
a particular expert would be efficacious. See H. EDWARDS & J. WnTE; THE LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR-
211-21 (1977) [hereinafter EDWARDS & WHITE] (attorney conduct seen as a determinant of bargaining
behavior). However, while questions asked during depositions, and like discovery techniques, have a
definite impact on the case, these developments occur after the client's cause of action has walked
through the attorney's door.
92. H. BAER & A. BRODER, How TO PREPARE AND NEGOTIATE CsEs FOR SETTLEMENT 63 (1967)
[hereinafter BAER & BRODER] (the basic question asked initially by both plaintiff's and defendant's
attorneys is, "What is the maximum and minimum sustainable verdict?").
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negligence, the client's potential recovery is diminished. The client's range
of opportunity, demarcated by the maximum trial value and the minimum
settlement value, would be shifted downward.
Lastly, the attorney's negligence would have to foreclose that oppor-
tunity for beneficial treatment before loss of chance could be considered. If
the client can still fully recover, then no chances have been lost. For
example, if a plaintiff's attorney fails to plead an available cause of action
and the pleadings can be amended to include that claim, then no chance has
been lost. It is only when the opportunity to recover fully is irretrievably
foreclosed that the doctrine applies.
As with medical malpractice, loss of chance would not operate in all
legal malpractice situations, but only those in which the requisite elements
exist. All four elements must be met in the legal context before loss of
chance can compensate for the difference between the potential oppor-
tunity to recover before the negligence occurs and the actual opportunity to
recover after it has been diminished by negligence.
C. Specific Legal Malpractice Contexts
1. The Failure-to-Appeal Context
The Daugert court refused to apply loss of chance to a legal malpractice
case because it found the elements of loss of chance lacking in a failure-to-
appeal context. 93 Although the court identified the client's opportunity to
recover, 94 it reasoned that the client's opportunity had been neither fore-
shortened nor foreclosed by the attorney's failure to perfect the appeal. The
client's chance to recover had not been foreshortened because there was no
"separate and distinguishable harm." '95 The negligent attorney would
ultimately be liable for all the client's damages and therefore the client's
chance for success had not been diminished. 96 Further, the client's oppor-
tunity was not foreclosed because in a legal malpractice situation, the
client's case can eventually be reviewed. 97
93. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 262, 704 P.2d at 605. See also supra notes 49-80 and accompanying
text.
94. The client has both a preexisting cause of action and potential chance for success, so that the
first two elements of loss of chance are met. The client's preexisting condition is defined by the
underlying judgment against the client, and the facts in the transcripts, records, and pleadings. Also, the
failure-to-appeal client has a potential opportunity for recovery, the next element required, because the
client has a chance to obtain a favorable ruling on appeal. The value of this potential opportunity may
range from a favorable ruling on appeal and a successful verdict on remand, to a minimum settlement
amount, either of which arguably might be zero. But regardless of the exact value of the case, the
failure-to-appeal client has a measurable interest before the attorney's negligence occurs.
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However, the client's opportunity was foreshortened, and in concluding
otherwise the Daugert court was wrong for two reasons. First, to say that
the client's opportunity was not diminished is contrary to the notion that a
chance of avoiding some adverse result or of achieving some favorable
result is a compensable interest.98 The loss of chance doctrine focuses on an
opportunity foreshortened, not on the ultimate success or failure. For loss
of chance, the cancer victim's ultimate survival is not the focus;99 so, for the
failure-to-appeal client, the success or failure of appeal should not be the
focus of the court. Looking to ultimate success or failure subsumes the
opportunity to recover into the final result, which is similar to requiring the
cancer victim to prove that the physician's misdiagnosis caused death. 100 In
the failure-to-appeal case, the court's approach measures the harm caused
by the client's preexisting cause of action, not the attorney's negligence.
Rather, loss of chance would measure the difference between the client's
potential opportunity for a successful appeal before the negligence and the
client's actual opportunity for recovery after the lawyer's malpractice.
The Daugert court was incorrect in concluding that the result on appeal
was not foreshortened for another reason. Recreated actions in malpractice
are an inferior substitute for the original litigation and are not an equivalent
replacement for the trial opportunity lost. 101 The client's opportunity to
make a successful claim or defense has been diminished. For instance,
where an underlying appeal is based on a claim that findings of fact are
contrary to the weight of the evidence, the appellate court would review the
record and determine as a matter of law whether the evidence was sufficient
to support the finding. In a malpractice context, however, the nature of the
review is different. If the malpractice judge concludes that the petition for
appeal based on insufficient evidence would have been denied, the review-
ing court would now be considering whether that conclusion is legally
supportable. Although this determination would necessarily involve con-
sidering the nature of the evidence presented, the appeal is tempered by
greater deference to the malpractice trial judge's decision.
Next, the court implied that complete foreclosure, the fourth element of
loss of chance, was lacking because the client had not exhausted all routes
of appeal. 102 The client could appeal an unfavorable decision at the trial
level, and again at the appeal level. The Washington court found that no
98. King, supra note 4, at 1354.
99. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
100. See Comment, supra note 4, at 769 (in loss of chance the harm is not death or some other
obvious harm, but rather it is loss of a chance to avoid the harm or to achieve a positive outcome).
101. See supra notes 10-28 and accompanying text.
102. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 261, 704 P.2d at 604. For a definition of the element of foreclosure,
see supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
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chance had been irretrievably lost because the failure-to-appeal client had
not yet suffered a foreclosed opportunity to recover. 103
The conclusion that no opportunities have been entirely foreclosed for
the failure-to-appeal client is also incorrect. The client's settlement oppor-
tunities, however minimal, have indeed been irretrievably lost by the at-
torney's action. 104 Also, because reconstruction by the trial-within-a-trial
method is inferior, the foreshortened opportunity to recover produced by
this inadequacy cannot be regained by a "retrial" of the appeal. 105 The
original appeal has been entirely foreclosed, and the alternate appeals
referred to by Justice Pearson are not literal replacements of the oppor-
tunity lost.
Malpractice courts treat failure-to-appeal cases differently, largely due
to practical considerations. 106 In addition, because causation is a question
of law rather than fact, failure-to-appeal cases are unique. 107 Other kinds of
legal malpractice cases present more compelling circumstances for
application of the doctrine.
2. Technical Violations: The Prototypical Case
Just as the cancer victim is the prototypical medical loss of chance
victim, the client whose attorney missed a statute of limitations or failed to
file an appearance presents the clearest example of when loss of chance
should operate in the legal context. Here, the client has come to the attorney
for assistance with litigation, and a potential opportunity to recover is
presented. When a statute of limitations is missed, the client's opportunity
is both foreshortened and foreclosed by the attorney's conduct.
First, it does not follow that no opportunity was foreshortened merely
because the malpractice procedure of trial-within-a-trial is still available for
the client. The reconstructed trial is particularly inaccurate when a statute
of limitations is missed, and substantially diminishes the quality of the
original opportunity for trial. The evidence is outdated and the claim is
stale, but the client must nonetheless recreate the underlying action.
0 8
Therefore, the client's opportunity to recover the value of the claim at trial
has been diminished by the delay the lawyer's malpractice caused. Current
103. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 261, 704 P.2d at 604.
104. See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
106. For a discussion of the practical rationales for different treatment of failure-to-appeal cases.
see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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methods of proof entirely ignore this difference in value between the
original trial opportunity and the second-rate trial-within-a-trial. 109
Moreover, the technical violation of missing the statute of limitations or
failing to appear entirely forecloses the client's opportunity to settle. The
lawyer's inaction has destroyed any motivation for the opponent to offer or
accept settlement. Even a weak cause of action may have some minimal
settlement value, which will never be realized due to the malpractice. 110
Before considering loss of chance, the question of whether the attorney
breached the standard of care must be answered. "'1 The client's potential
recovery value assumes only reasonable care, and does not make the
attorney a guarantor. A plaintiff may in fact have a worthless cause of action
and recover nothing, even with skillful treatment. Judgmental decisions
made in good faith and with a fully informed client could not be called into
question, regardless of the result. 112
3. Errors During Trial or Trial Preparation
An attorney's negligence during the discovery or trial phase may also
foreshorten a client's opportunity to recover from or defend against a cause
of action. If the attorney's negligence reduces the client's potential recov-
ery range, shifting the values of settlement and trial downward, the attorney
has caused a loss of chance.113 Merely creating a reduced opportunity does
not end the inquiry, however. The next consideration is whether the negli-
gence has also completely foreclosed the client's chance to recover.
A number of factors influence the foreclosure issue when the attorney's
conduct occurs after initiation of the litigation process. Discovery errors
may or may not reduce the settlement or trial value of the case. For instance,
the opposing party's awareness of the error would affect settlement oppor-
tunities, which may depend on the degree of error committed. The more
egregious the attorney's conduct, the more likely it is to directly affect the
client's opportunity.
109. See supra notes 10-25 and accompanying text (traditional methods of proof in legal malprac-
tice).
110. See BAER & BRODER, supra note 92, at 63 (the authors note the importance of determining
both the minimum and maximum value of any case, regardless of the opponent's assessment).
111. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (negligence is proven before causation and loss of
chance can be considered).
112. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (courts take different attitudes toward judg-
mental negligence than toward technical violations).
113. See King, supra note 4, at 1364 (in discussing partial losses, Professor King's medically-
oriented analysis is similar to that which leads to the conclusion that a reduction in a client's range of
opportunity is a partial loss).
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A reduction in opportunity created by during-trial error is more closely
connected to the result at trial and is more difficult to isolate as a measura-
ble loss. 11 4 For example, if a key witness is negligently questioned, possi-
bly reducing the judgment in favor of the client, the only way to measure the
loss is by comparison to the actual trial result. The trial-within-a-trial
method becomes easier to rationalize in this context. However, since trial
conduct involves more discretionary attorney conduct, these malpractice
actions rarely pass the threshold question of whether negligence
occurred. 115
Whether loss of chance can be applied in legal malpractice rests on the
issues raised in Daugert. 116 Under what circumstances can it truly be said
that negligence, first, reduced an opportunity for beneficial treatment, and,
second, resulted in complete foreclosure of that opportunity? The answer
depends on how far the courts are willing to strain the idea that the trial-
within-a-trial provides a replacement for the client's lost opportunity. The
answer also depends on whether the courts are willing to recognize the
reality of settlement opportunities.
D. Procedural and Equitable Considerations
If the injury approach to loss of chance were recognized in legal malprac-
tice, courts could retain traditional standards of proof, yet achieve practical
and equitable results. Dissatisfaction with but for causation focuses on the
plaintiff's procedural difficulties as reflected in the trial-within-a-trial
method. 117 As noted by Professor King, "The problem, however, is not the
standard of proof, but the object to which that standard is applied." 118
Under loss of chance, causation and injury must be isolated. "19 Whether
negligence exists should be a separate question from the nature and extent
114. See Comment, supra note 4, at 769 (setting forth the current methods available to assign value
to partial losses, each of which depends on reference to the value of some greater whole).
115. It is difficult for a client to prove that allegations based on handling of witnesses, evidence, or
trial procedures are not within the attorney's exercise of judgment. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616
F.2d 924, 930-35 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980) (methods of preparing a case, manners
of presenting proof, and styles of examining witnesses are clearly discretionary areas of litigation). See
generally MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 3, § 578, at 719 ("[R]arely can the client prove [charges of
negligence during trial as] outside the spectrum of permissible tactics."). In England, the barrister is
virtually immune from liability for any act or omission that occurs at trial. Rondel v. Worsley, [ 1967] 3
All E.R. 993; Baikie v. Chankless, [1811] 3 Camp. 17. Perhaps there is no satisfactory method of
handling during-trial negligence.
116. See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text for an analysis of the Daugert opinion.
117. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text for some of the reasons for dissatisfaction given
by judicial and collegiate critics.
118. King, supra note 4, at 1366.
119. Id. at 1363. See Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 634, 664 P.2d at 487.
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of the loss. To establish an injury under the loss of chance doctrine, the
client must prove that, but for the attorney's negligence, the diminished
opportunity to recover was lost. In order to prove cause, the client must
show that the claim or defense was meritorious by a but for standard. 120 The
trial-within-a-trial method of proof would not be necessary. The pleadings
should suffice to meet this causal burden, analogous to a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. 121
Tort law requires only that the plaintiff prove cause by a more-likely-
than-not standard. 122 The-substantial factor standard, although inapplicable
with loss of chance, supports the notion that courts do not require the
injured plaintiff to prove his harm beyond a reasonable doubt.123 In con-
trast, the trial-within-a-trial method treats the loss of chance as if it were
either a certainty or an impossibility, depending on whether the result of the
underlying trial is found to be different or the same.124
The process of identifying and assessing the value of the interest
destroyed' 25 would be most substantially affected by loss of chance
because restrictions against expert testimony would not be justified. 126
120. The rejection of the all or nothing approach to valuing loss of chance does not necessarily
affect the continuing validity of the all or nothing rule for causation, and loss of chance still requires the
plaintiff to meet the but for standard. King, supra note 4, at 1394.
121. The claim has merit unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Note that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are frequently granted, so that redefining the
injury in no way approximates strict liability for litigation attorneys.
122. Daugert, 104 Wn. 2d at 260, 704 P.2d at 604. Negligence requires that the event more
probably than not caused the harm. See, e.g., O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 73 Wn. 2d 814, 824,440 P.2d 823
(1968), noted in Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wn. 2d 254, 704 P.2d 600 (1985); PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 12, § 42; see also supra note 58.
123. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §§ 431-433 (1965) (use of the substantial
factor test recommended in certain examples); PROSSER & KEEMON, supra note 12, §§ 30-342 (multiple
causal elements).
124. The line of cases applying the certainty standard have been criticized as insulating lawyers
from liability because the degree of proof is so difficult to satisfy. See Comment, supra note 26, at 670
("Except in those rare instances where the initial action was a 'sure thing,' the certainty requirement
protects attorneys. ... ); see also supra note 58.
125. The valuation process identifies and assesses the value of the interest destroyed. King, supra
note 4, at 1353.
126. Proof of settlement opportunities should require "the expert testimony of attorneys familiar
with trial and settlement of such disputes." Peck, A New TortLiabilityforLack oflnformed Consent in
Legal Matters, 44 LA. L. REv. 1289, 1299 (1984). Where the question is whether the attorney has
breached an express or implied contract, or violated the duty of care in conduct unconnected with
litigation, the use of expert evidence is generally allowed as to the standard of care. See, e.g., Bent v.
Green, 39 Conn. Supp. 416, 466 A.2d 322 (1983); Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wn. 2d 854, 601 P.2d 1279
(1979). But see Comment, Use of Expert Testimony in Attorney Malpractice Cases, 15 HASTGS L.L
584, 584 (1964) (noting that expert testimony is "nonexistent" in California). There is some authority
for admitting expert evidence to prove the probable outcome of the underlying trial, but courts are
reluctant to admit such evidence when an objection is raised. See, e.g., Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J.
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With current methods of proof, testimony as to settlement value is not
admitted because the trial-within-a-trial jury's determination of damages is
thought to be less speculative than expert testimony on settlement. 127
Current practice fails to consider that a large majority of cases are settled
before trial. 128 It also ignores the fact that expert testimony as to settlement
is less speculative than the trial-within-a-trial verdict. 129 In valuing the lost
legal chance, however, expert's testimony of settlement value would be
used. 130
Super. 290, 319 A.2d 781, 784 (1974) (evidence rejected on the alternative bases of being speculative
and time-consuming). But see Duncan v. Lord, 409 F. Supp. 687, 692 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (judge, upon
stipulation of parties, used expert testimony to determine judgment on the reasoning that evidence was
not elsewhere available).
127. See, e.g., Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J.Super 290, 319 A.2d 781, 784 (1974) ("[N]o expert
can suppose with certainty the private blends of hopes and fears that might have come together to
produce a settlement .... "). Under current practice, the difference should be noted between
settlement as damages, where evidence is strictly prohibited, and settlement as the source of negli-
gence, where testimony may be permitted. See Fulton v. Woodford, 26 Ariz. App. 17, 545 P.2d 979,
985 (1976) (evidence only admitted upon proof that the parties would have agreed to a settlement and the
sum would have been paid); but see Duncan v. Lord, 409 F. Supp. 687, 693 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (allowing
settlement value as an award for damages).
128. See Bridgeman, Legal Malpractice-A Consideration of the Elements of a Strong Plaintiff's
Case, 30 S.C.L. REV. 213,234-36 (1979) (92.9% of personal injury suits filed are settled without trial).
"If most of the cases handled by lawyers are settled, it would be preferable to determine what should
have resulted if negotiations for settlement had been conducted in accordance with settlement standards
of the profession rather than what would have happened in the unlikely event the case had gone to trial."
Peck, supra note 126, at 1300.
129. Lost chances have been given legitimate value in other contexts. The "hypothetical market
theory" is an early contract notion which rests on the premise that chances possess value in their own
right and loss of such value merits redress. Mange v. Unicorn Press, 129 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(the chance to win a puzzle contest was compensable to one of 23,548 contestants); Kansas City, M. &
0. Ry. v. Bell, 197 S.W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (delay in shipment of hogs, value of chance lost
between first and second prize awarded as compensation); Chaplin v. Hicks, [191112 K.B. 786 (C.A.)
(the chance to compete in a beauty context was redressable). The hypothetical market theory places
value on the lost chance by using evidence of the value that a market trader would be willing to pay for
the chance. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.3, at 155 (1973); Comment, supra note
4, at 771 ("If a thirty percent chance to live could be purchased in a market, would a patient having no
chance to live be willing to buy the thirty percent chance?"). Assessing settlement value is analogous to
the hypothetical market theory. In a sense, the amount represents the present value of the client's cause
of action. EDWARDS & WHrrE, supra note 91, at 217-18. The authors tabulated factors augmenting and
limiting the amount of tort settlement and, without soliciting answers, found a high correlation in the
answers given from both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys. This suggests that, while settlement
value is not subject to an arbitrary formula, the methods used by attorneys are consistent enough to
justify the use of expert testimony. See also BAER & BRODER, supra note 92, at 63-73 (setting forth 15
questions to use in appraising the settlement value of a case).
130. Inroads to admissibility of settlement evidence have recently been made. See Chocktoot v.
Smith, 289 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255 (1977) (the purpose of the trial-within-a-trial method is to show what
should have happened, not what actually would have happened); Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super.
290, 319 A.2d 781 (1974) (under some circumstances, expert testimony may be used as an alternative or
in addition to the trial-within-a-trial method). Settlement evidence might benefit either side of the
litigation. For instance, a defendant whose attorney failed to file an appearance might want to introduce
evidence of settlement value to rebut expert testimony on the attorney's behalf that the underlying
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Loss of chance could properly be applied to technical violation cases.
These cases create the most sympathy for the client and emphasize the
harshness of the but for standard in the trial-within-a-trial method. 131
Limiting the application of loss of chance to this well-defined class of cases
would promote administrative efficiency. Further, since missed statute of
limitations cases account for a large percentage of litigation malpractice,
these cases can be seen as ideal situations for operation of the loss of chance
doctrine. 132
Recovery for loss of the right to trial finds support in constitutional law.
Deprivation of due process is a compensable right 33 and by analogy a
client's loss of right to litigate should be compensated. Loss of chance
recognizes that the client should be able to present evidence regarding the
settlement value of the case, and it would be a question of fact whether the
loss of the right to trial should be more than nominal.
Incorporating loss of chance into legal malpractice would provide the
courts with a procedural and substantive basis for accurately compensating
a client for the interests destroyed by professional negligence. Transferring
this doctrine from medical to legal malpractice would make legal princi-
ples consistent between professions where similar circumstantial factors
dictate analogy. 134
defense had little value. On the other hand, an attorney might want to introduce settlement evidence
where the amount entered against the defendant was excessive.
131. See supra notes 34-36 and 108-12 and accompanying text.
132. Missed statute of limitations are the "most common error" producing malpractice litigation.
MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 3, § 558, at 692. A 1981 California Bar Association survey revealed that
51% of all legal malpractice claims filed in California involved missed filing dates. Two Types of
MalpracticeAre Riskiest, Nat'l Law J., Oct. 26, 1981, at 3, col. 1. From 1981 to 1983, 25.2% of all legal
malpractice resulted from a failure to commence the action or proceedings. Gates, supra note 9, at 79.
The complementary situation for the defense attorney is failure to file an appearance. In these cases,
proof of proximate cause again requires evidence of better results if the action had been defended.
MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 3, § 562, at 697-98.
133. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), the Court held that plaintiffs who had suffered injury
to their procedural due process rights but had failed to demonstrate consequential injury were entitled to
recover nominal damages. However, the Court limited its holding to the procedural due process
violation before it and directed courts to examine common law tort rules in determining principles of
compensation relevant to any particular claim. Id. at 267; see also Williams v. Trans World Airlines,
660 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir. 1981) ("[D]amages for emotional harm are to be presumed where there is
an infringement of a substantive constitutional right.").
134. While some of the same problems of multiple causation exist with legal and medical
malpractice, factual distinctions emerge immediately. Because legal services are by nature judgmental
and tactical, courts are reluctant to impose liability too quickly. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F2d
924, 930-35 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980) (broad immunity for trial tactics). See
generally MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 3, § 553, at 677-79 (other settled areas of discretion for
litigation attorneys). Also, half of the lawsuits brought to lawyers are "losers" in the broad conceptual
framework of litigation as conflict-resolution: there are two sides to every lawsuit, and only one can
prevail. The approach of health sciences is conceptually more optimistic, and patients are not paired off,




The Washington court has laid the groundwork for applying loss of
chance to legal malpractice. The doctrine involves two steps, the first in
reconceptualizing the harm and the second in measuring damages. Where
the circumstances of the attorney-client relationship satisfy the four ele-
ments of loss of chance, the doctrine applies a realistic measurement of
damages for the aggrieved client without exposing a litigation attorney to
strict liability. The harshness of the trial-within-a-trial method can be
alleviated without changing traditional standards of causation.
Polly A. Lord
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provide advice and judgment; and while the profession aims to cure more than half of its patients,
preexisting illnesses nonetheless influence attempts at health care. In short, the problems of both
professions may be similar. Differences between the two professions exist, but in certain discrete areas
of legal and medical malpractice it is difficult to justify any judicial reluctance to apply loss of chance to
legal, as well as medical, malpractice.
Vol. 61:1479, 1986
